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Abstract
The last decade has seen an explosion of meta-philosophical work on
’conceptual engineering’. Beyond simple analysis of concepts, concep-
tual engineering allows for evaluation and improvement of concepts
according to the purposes to which they will be used. This paper
sketches a pluralist account of conceptual engineering and provides a
distinction between two different and often conflicting kinds of concep-
tual engineering: naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE) and moral
conceptual engineering (MCE), distinguished not by their methods,
but by their roles, functions, and purposes. Using the example of ani-
mal welfare, we demonstrate the application of both MCE and NCE
and show how the different contexts in which a concept is used can
create conflicting demands but also how concordance between these
demands can strengthen a concept.
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“We are as sailors who are forced to rebuild their ship on the
open sea, without ever being able to start fresh from the bottom
up. Wherever a beam is taken away, immediately a new one must
take its place, and while this is done, the rest of the ship is used as
support. In this way, the ship may be completely rebuilt like new
with the help of the old beams and driftwood—but only through
gradual rebuilding.”
– Otto Neurath (1921, pp. 75-76)
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a surprising resurgence of methodological debates
about the tools and methods of philosophy itself.1 Largely due to Sally
Haslanger’s influential work on ameliorative analysis (Haslanger 2005), ‘con-
ceptual engineering’ has become one of the most prominent subjects of re-
cent philosophical debate. Yet, while conceptual engineering has arguably
been practiced for as long as philosophy itself (see Burgess et al. 2020 for an
overview), philosophers have only recently started to take a meta-philosophical
perspective on this ‘way of doing philosophy’.
One simple (though not entirely accurate) way to introduce conceptual
engineering is as a reply to ‘conceptual analysis’, i.e. the analytical dissection
of concepts.2 Historically - at least in the Western analytical tradition of
philosophy - conceptual analysis has played a dominant role, and perhaps
still dominates today, as a “comfortable” a priori armchair methodology that
seeks to clarify and illuminate the meaning of concepts used in both ordinary
language and science. Much of the literature that criticizes the dominance of
conceptual analysis in philosophy highlights the limitations and deficiencies
of this intuitionist approach to concepts (see Devitt 1981; Kornblith 2002;
Papineau 2013; Machery 2016; Veit 2019a). Primarily, when a concept is
deficient in various respects, we may wonder how much sense it makes to try
and analyse its use, rather than improve or replace the concept with a better
one. With the initial roadblock out of the way, we can try to understand
conceptual engineering as a philosophical method or practice that is opposed
to ‘mere’ conceptual analysis.
1For overviews see Sytsma and Buckwalter (2016) and Cappelen et al. (2016).
2Rudolf Carnap (1950), for instance, was an early proponent of conceptual engineering
by promoting what he called ‘explication’.
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There is little consensus, however, on how conceptual engineering and
its method should be defined (see Burgess et al. 2020 for the first edited
volume on conceptual engineering).3 Indeed, if there is any consensus, then
it is an implicit agreement that one should actively resist the temptation to
find any precise definitions, for this kind of conceptual analysis stands op-
posed to very the goals of conceptual engineering. This might perhaps be
considered an unpromising start for a meta-philosophical paper on concep-
tual engineering. However, we do not intend to suggest that the excitement
of many participants in the debate is misplaced. Indeed, we are confident
that there is room to clear up some conceptual confusions and clarify the
foundations of conceptual engineering – and thereby philosophy itself. While
care must be taken not to overestimate what may be achieved, we believe
that this paper will offer us the necessary space to improve (i.e. conceptually
engineer) conceptual engineering itself by drawing an important distinction
between two different and often conflicting kinds of conceptual engineering:
naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE) and moral conceptual engineering
(MCE).
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will remove some po-
tential stumbling blocks and clarify how we intend to use several terms and
concepts present in the debate. Furthermore, Section 2 introduces the dis-
tinction between NCE and MCE, clarifying important differences to the
groundwork by Rudolf Carnap on ‘explication’ and Sally Haslanger’s work
on ‘ameliorative analysis’. Out of this picture a novel account of concep-
tual engineering emerges that is much closer to Otto Neurath than it is to
Carnap. In Section 3, we illustrate how these two kinds of conceptual engi-
neering can come into conflict by discussing the historical development of the
concept of animal welfare. Finally, Section 4 concludes the discussion and
offers some suggestions for future meta-philosophical research on these two
kinds of conceptual engineering and its potential use to untangle the philo-
sophical and scientific debates on controversial concepts like race, gender,
health, disability, and mental disorder.
3Cappelen and Plunkett (2020) in their editorial introduction to this very first collected
volume on conceptual engineering suggest that it would have been impossible to play
“editorial police” for standardisation of definitions amongst authors, deeming it a futile
endeavour to attempt the development of collectively agreed upon definitions (p. 2).
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2 What is, and why engage in, Conceptual
Engineering?
The initial answer to the second question - why engage in conceptual en-
gineering? - is a simple one. Philosophers and scientists alike have been
engaged in conceptual engineering since the earliest days of their respective
fields. Indeed, we deem it appropriate to consider conceptual engineering an
all-too present phenomena within ordinary discourse. Let us illustrate the
point with a thought experiment.
Imagine a newly engaged couple that are planning their wedding. They
intend to invite their family and close friends. While Brian’s list of invited
family members includes distant relatives that live in close proximity of their
home in New York, Alex does not consider his genealogically proximate rela-
tives living across Europe as part of his family. Brian is appalled by this and
tries to convince Alex to invite ALL the members of his family. Conversely,
Alex criticizes Brian for inviting what he would consider to be random ac-
quaintances to their wedding. Eventually, they are led to discuss the very
definition of what it means to be a friend or family. Unfortunately for them,
neither of these concepts allows for a straightforward conceptual analysis that
would allow either to determine whether a particular individual that stands
in a genealogical or social relationship to them should be classified under
either extension of the respective concept. To settle their conflict, they must
engage in conceptual engineering and thereby clarify the purposes to which
the concepts of family and friends are put to use.
As our thought experiment hopefully illustrates, concepts are not free-
floating entities. They serve a variety of (sometimes conflicting) purposes
forming the basis on which to evaluate and improve them. As our distinction
between NCE and MCE will show, the two kinds of conceptual engineering
raise important questions of what to do when scientific desiderata and moral
and political values come apart. Even when philosophers, scientists, or the
public are engaged in what they merely consider the analysis of a concept,
they will inevitably engage in at least a minor form of conceptual engineering.
This will be contingent on the criteria they use to evaluate the very purposes
of the concept they are employing and trying to explicate.4
4While we are skeptical about the possibility of such pure logical conceptual analy-
sis without some evaluative component, considerations of space prevent us providing an
extended argument for this position here.
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Before we can introduce our distinction between NCE and MCE how-
ever, we are faced with the task of clarifying the way we intend to use several
of the terms and concepts within the debate. While the rapid proliferation of
different ways terms and concepts such as ‘concepts’, ‘conceptual engineer-
ing’, ‘explication’, ‘revisionary analysis’ and ‘amelioration’ have been defined
and defended within the debate has led to a broad coverage of the conceptual
space, philosophers in this debate have become faced with an almost damning
criticism of the conceptual engineering method itself. As Cappelen and Plun-
kett (2020) allude to in their brief introduction to conceptual engineering,
the improvement and change of existing concepts can lead to discontinuities
in how a concept is understood and used by different individuals and groups.
Rather than resolve conflict and improve our inherited concepts, we may end
up with misunderstandings and merely verbal disputes, a problem that has
indeed received much attention in the history, sociology, and philosophy of
science not only since Kuhn (1962), but also the Vienna Circle, who were
concerned with eliminating vagueness from scientific concepts and language
(see Uebel 2019).5 Perhaps most interesting here, is the conflict between
scientific concepts and their parallel folk concepts among the public. As
Nersessian (1989) argued early on, there is a surprisingly large discrepancy
in how particular concepts are understood within and outside of science.
Contested concepts include human nature (Linquist et al. 2011), genes (Dar-
Nimrod and Heine 2011), and innateness (Machery et al. 2019). This raises
important challenges for conceptual engineering and its role within science
education that we shall partially address in Section 3, where we apply our
bipartite account of conceptual engineering to the concept of animal welfare.
Though some degree of vagueness may aid the initial popularization
of an idea, we would much prefer to offer a precise and clear contribution
that aids understanding. While ultimately disagreeing with Cappelen and
Plunkett’s (overly) broad definition of conceptual engineering, it does provide
a useful basis on which to build our own definition:
“Conceptual Engineering = (i) The assessment of representa-
tional devices, (ii) reflections on and proposal for how to improve
representational devices, and (iii) efforts to implement the pro-
posed improvements.”
5See Chalmers (2011); Jenkins (2014); Jackson (2014) for recent philosophical dis-
cussions on verbal disputes and Thagard (1992) for an ambitious account of conceptual
changes in science.
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– Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, p. 3)
It seems surprising that Cappelen and Plunkett opt for representational de-
vices, rather than concepts in their definition of conceptual engineering, given
the very title of the practice. Their justification here, however, is far from
satisfying, stating that this is “[p]urely for aesthetic reason: ‘representational
devices engineering’ doesn’t roll off the tongue in the way ‘conceptual engi-
neering’ does” (Cappelen and Plunkett 2020, p. 3). Our dissatisfaction with
this definition is twofold. Firstly, it is misleading and will hence add confusion
about conceptual engineering, rather than help to alleviate it. Secondly, it
is far too broad – and hence becomes uninformative. While their definition
is perhaps able to accommodate all the different methods and approaches
proposed by different authors under the umbrella term of ‘conceptual engi-
neering’, little has been gained if nothing is excluded either. Here, we should
keep Godfrey-Smith’s warning in mind that “[o]ne of the hazards of philos-
ophy is the temptation to come up with theories that are too broad and
sweeping” (2003, p. 5).
We commend their pluralism and willingness to let alternatives prolif-
erate, hence avoiding the danger of needlessly restricting the future direction
of meta-philosophical work on conceptual engineering. Representational de-
vices, however, are not the right target, as they are manifold and so diverse
that they hardly share any features beyond their representational function.
In particular, we are concerned with this leading to the accidental combina-
tion of two separate philosophical debates: one on conceptual engineering,
and one on the status of scientific models. While it is true that there has
been too little overlap between the two debates, we should be careful not to
overgeneralize and repeat mistakes. Veit (2019b), for instance, argues that
the philosophical literature on models has been misguided in its monistic
attempts to provide a general account or framework of models in science –
missing their epistemic richness and diversity – instead proposing what he
dubs ‘model pluralism’. Similarly, we argue that a broad definition of concep-
tual engineering as the evaluation and improvement of ALL representational
devices must fail. Many scientific instruments, for instance, serve a variety
of representational functions and are improved in what one could call ‘en-
gineering’ efforts. These improvements, however, are highly contingent on
their scientific context and the representational goals to which they are put
to use, with a large diversity across the sciences. It would be quite surprising
to say the least, if an account is able to generalize not only over all these
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different representational instruments, but also across drawings, models, and
lastly concepts – and still be informative.
Furthermore, we think it to some extent misguided to seek for a ‘theory
of concepts’. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, there are too many
different definitions and uses of the word ‘concept’ in philosophy, psychology,
cognitive science, and ordinary folk discourse (see Margolis et al. 1999 for an
overview of the diversity of alternative views). Secondly, a concept of concept
itself is subject to improvement. We are well-advised to follow Neurath’s
(1921) anti-foundationalist dictum (as shown in the epigraph of this paper)
to treat philosophy as a constant reworking of our concepts with concepts
already in play. Cartwright et al. (2008) argue that there are at least five
different ways Neurath’s boat metaphor can be interpreted. Partly owing to
Neurath’s frequent use of the metaphor throughout his work, with the earliest
use dating back to 1913, it has been influential as a slogan for naturalism
(largely owing to Quine (1960)) and practical philosophy (of science). In line
with Cartwright et al. (2008), we think the following motivation is the core
of Neurath’s philosophy and, moreover, one of the most important instances
of conceptual engineering:
“What propelled Neurath was an idea: the idea not simply that
our stock of knowledge claims keeps on changing forever, but
that a decisive revision of our concept of knowledge is required if
reason is to fulfil its Enlightenment promise.”
– Nancy Cartwright et al. (2008, p. 92)
In this, our account of conceptual engineering is closer to Neurath than it
is to Carnap, something that will become apparent throughout this paper.
Let us now spell out the details of our account. We propose an alternative
account of conceptual engineering that is faithful to the original label, pro-
vides recognition of pluralism distinctive to other forms of assessment and
improvement, and - contrary to Cappelen and Plunkett’s deflationary ac-
count - offers some genuine improvement on our understanding of the set of
practices we label ‘conceptual engineering’:
Conceptual Engineering = (i) The assessment of concepts,
categories, and classificatory systems, (ii) determination of their
relevant contexts and purposes to which they are and should be
put to use, (iii) reflections on and proposal for how to improve
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them, and (iv) proposals for and active participation in the im-
plementation of the suggested improvements.
For the sake of brevity one may want to call our account the 3C account,
Conceptual Engineering Pluralism, or alternatively Ameliorative Plu-
ralism. The extension from concepts to categories and classificatory sys-
tems more generally is intended to cover the different senses in which the
term ‘concept’ is generally used in cognitive science, philosophy, and ordi-
nary language. While this pluralist definition still covers a broad range of
devices or items, we deem these entities sufficiently similar to fall under the
heading of ‘conceptual engineering’.6 We think it better to treat conceptual
engineering as a diverse set of methods and practices with a loose degree of
family resemblance – rather than equate it with either Carnapian explication
or Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis. While we can only offer a sketch of our
full account here, the building blocks are now in place to turn to our main
purpose in this paper.
Our goal in this paper is to draw a distinction between two distinct
kinds of conceptual engineering that can come into conflict in practice. They
do not differ in their methods, but rather in the ends at which they are
aimed. This follows from Haslanger’s 2005 original description of ameliora-
tive analysis as “a project that seeks to identify what legitimate purposes we
might have (if any) [...] and to develop concepts that would help us achieve
these ends” (p. 11). In this paper, we argue that the purposes to which
conceptual engineering are put can be primarily grouped into two categories
- scientific and moral. In the first instance, we aim at making concepts more
scientifically adequate, and improving them for epistemic and pragmatic pur-
poses. For the second, we often want our concepts to do work in the moral
or political sphere, and must consider the relevant consequences there.
We do not mean to suggest that these two kinds of conceptual engineer-
ing are exhaustive. For example, a third kind suggests itself by considering
a kind of value that is different from both moral/political values and epis-
temic/scientific ones, i.e. aesthetic values. Aesthetic conceptual engineering
(ACE), however, we contend that in most cases these will be philosophically
6Indeed, we think the metaphysical complexities of what concepts really are can be
largely avoided. Yet, again unfortunately the present paper does not offer us enough
space to argue for this claim at a length that would to it justice. For our present purposes
it should be sufficient to recognize that our introduced distinction between NCE and
MCE is largely independent of the metaphysics of concepts.
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less interesting and relevant.
Thus, we offer a bipartite account of conceptual engineering, broken
down into moral conceptual engineering (MCE) and naturalist conceptual
engineering (NCE), as will be elaborated in the following sections.
2.1 Moral Conceptual Engineering
The first type of conceptual engineering we wish to distinguish is moral con-
ceptual engineering (MCE). This type of conceptual engineering is under-
taken with specifically moral, political and/or social goals in mind, and thus
is performed with reference to these types of norms. As mentioned, it is
not a unique methodology that distinguishes MCE, but instead the ends
at which it aims. We take all conceptual engineering to follow the general
practices we have described above, but evaluated and improved according to
norms associated with specific goals. For MCE, these purposes are moral,
social and political: in aim of what enables values such as right, wellbeing
or justice. Examples of concepts that may fall into this category (though,
as we will argue, most concepts will fall into both depending on the specific
application) are poverty, race, gender, welfare and sentience. We offer the
following definition for MCE:
Moral Conceptual Engineering = (i) The moral, political,
and social assessment of concepts, categories, and classificatory
systems, (ii) determination of their relevant context and purposes
to which they are and should be put to use, (iii) reflections on
and proposal for how to improve them, and (iv) proposals for
and active participation in the implementation of the suggested
improvements.
MCE may appear similar to what some take ‘ameliorative analysis’ to con-
sist of. This process, developed by Haslanger (2005) relies on normative
considerations in assessing and developing concepts. Normativity here is of-
ten taken to refer to moral, social and political considerations, such as those
included within MCE. However, this is a mistake arising from Haslanger’s
discussion of politically charged concepts such as race and gender. While it is
true that Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis overtly relies on moral norms in
engineering/improving concepts, it need not. Instead, amelioration is simply
the act of improvement. After analysing a concept and identifying its faults
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relative to some norms or purposes, amelioration is the process of modifying
the concept such that it better serves these ends. It is true that these ends
are often moral, political and social, such as Haslanger’s own revisions of
the concepts of gender and race formed by “considering what categories we
should employ in the quest for social justice” (Haslanger 2005, p. 11). How-
ever, they do not necessarily have to be - as will be discussed in Section 2.2,
they could also be scientific and in general “whether or not an analysis is an
improvement on existing meanings depends on the purposes of the inquiry”
(Haslanger 2005, p. 24). Thus, MCE is distinct from ameliorative analy-
sis, instead simply forming a distinct part of analysis of this type. We will
turn now to what we consider to be the second primary type of conceptual
engineering.
2.2 Naturalist Conceptual Engineering
NCE will be quite familiar to anyone who is acquainted with Carnap’s 1950
concept of ‘explication’. It would be a mistake, however, to equate all concep-
tual engineering within science as explication or to think that only Carnapian
explication is a justified form of conceptual engineering within science. It is
not our goal here to ameliorate Carnapian explication, a particular method
with a rather clear but limited role in science. We shall offer a brief survey of
the diverse ways NCE can occur in science. Importantly, unlike Carnapian
explication, NCE is instead a set of methods of which Carnapian explication
is a member.7 In Carnap’s own words:
“The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact con-
cept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logi-
cal development, or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed,
more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of
logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of
explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier concept”
– Carnap (1947, pp. 8-9)
7Novaes (2018) argues that Carnapian explication while not explicitly about moral or
political values, is implicitly endorsing Enlightenment values such as emancipation and
freedom – in line with Carnap’s political stance (see Carus 2007). Ordinarily, however,
Carnapian explication is merely seen as scientific concept refinement, which is the received
view we shall follow. If Carnapian explication is political, then it would be even more of
a mistake to equate it with NCE.
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Carnap, like other members of the Vienna circle, is mostly concerned with
the usefulness or fruitfulness of the use of concepts in the formulation of
scientific laws. In this vain, he 1950 discusses the concept of Pisces as an
explication of the concept of fish – better able to play a role in scientific laws.
The philosophy of science, however, has long moved on from such a narrow
conception of scientific progress. Indeed, there is an incredible diversity of
different roles concepts play in science, and we do not dare to begin listing
all of them here. Rather, we offer the following pluralist account of NCE.
Naturalist Conceptual Engineering = (i) The scientific as-
sessment of concepts, categories, and classificatory systems, (ii)
determination of their relevant context and purposes to which
they are and should be put to use, (iii) reflections on and pro-
posal for how to improve them, and (iv) proposals for and active
participation in the implementation of the suggested improve-
ments.
The primary purpose of distinguishing NCE from MCE is to clarify de-
bates about concepts that play a role in both science and society. Such con-
cepts, intended to play a diversity of roles and purposes are manifold. From
Haslanger’s discussion of race and gender to old philosophical debates on
sentience and welfare – many of the most philosophical discussions attempt
to untangle a muddled field of concepts, categorizations, and classificatory
schemes. Where there is confusion, philosophy has a useful role to play. To
do so, however, we need to disentangle the different roles, functions, and pur-
poses for which respective concepts are put to use. Here the context in which
the concept is used is key. This may be disappointing to those who try to
provide a unified picture of all of conceptual engineering – but such monist
aspirations should be resisted. Indeed, philosophers can still play useful roles,
but they need to dive into the actual conceptual debates, with constant care
given to resist the temptation of extrapolating from one conceptual debate to
all others. Let us now move on to illustrate how the competing demands of
these two kinds of conceptual engineering can come into conflict in practice,
through the example of a concept which squarely falls into both the scientific
and moral/political domain: animal welfare.
11
3 The Case of Animal Welfare: Concepts,
Conflict, and Concord
Animal welfare provides a fruitful example of the use of this distinction within
conceptual engineering; a concept which plays both moral and scientific roles
that have historically grounded deliberations about which concept to use.
Animal welfare has long been recognised as a moral as well as a scientific
concept - what Fraser et al. (1997) have called a ’bridging concept’ that
sits between science and ethics, playing an important role in both areas.
Welfare is studied scientifically, both to gain increased understanding of the
behaviour and biology of animals, and to inform moral deliberation. It is
therefore important to ensure we have a concept that fulfils both roles. Both
MCEand NCE are relevant and important in deliberations as to the best
concept of animal welfare.
Within science, the study of animal welfare has been increasing ex-
ponentially over the last few decades (Walker et al. 2014). The science of
animal welfare aims to measure the welfare of animals under different con-
ditions. Scientists use a range of physiological and behavioural indicators,
such as heart rate, cortisol levels, vocalisations and preference behaviour.
The measurement of animal welfare thus heavily relies on the concept of wel-
fare in use. The selected welfare concept will determine which measurements
are considered valid, as well as which conditions will turn out to impact
welfare. In order to practice this science, it is plainly important to have a
meaningful concept of welfare. We need to be clear on exactly what it is we
mean when we speak of welfare – what it is that comprises this state in an
animal. Without knowing exactly what it is that we’re trying to measure,
we can’t hope to assess which conditions matter, or which indicators will be
the most accurate.
As the primary scientific role of welfare is as a target for scientific
investigation, to fulfil this role it must therefore be something measurable.
Additionally, if we take welfare to be the appropriate relevant target for
investigation, a central concept in itself rather than a property or proxy of
some other state, it must also be something which is fundamental. Here,
we take fundamental to mean that it is something necessary for welfare -
something without which we would not be able to characterise welfare - as
well as something that is intrinsically important to welfare, such that its
importance cannot be collapsed onto some other state.
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Animal welfare is also a central concept in ethics. Particularly since the
publication of Peter Singer’s ’Animal Liberation’ in 1975 (Singer 1975), moral
concern for animals has become a high priority for both moral philosophers
and the wider community. Human uses of animals include food, research,
sport and companionship, and the treatment of animals within these realms
is under ever-increasing scrutiny. Animal welfare is relevant to decisions
made by legislators, producers and consumers with regards to housing and
treatment of animals. Expenditure of time and resources on animal welfare
improvements requires a clear understanding of what welfare is, in order to
ensure interventions are effective. Otherwise, the risk is that efforts may be
wasted on providing conditions that may appear to increase welfare without
actually doing so.
Welfare itself is typically considered to have moral importance. “Any
conception of animal welfare inherently involves values because it pertains
to what is better or worse for animals” (Fraser et al. 1997, p. 188). Welfare
plays a central role in many moral theories (Crisp 2017). Deliberations about
animal welfare, particularly within consequentialist frameworks, aim to de-
termine how we can maximise welfare. Thus, to fill this role, our concept of
welfare must contain something that we consider to morally valuable. We
also want the concept to be capable of identifying those bearers of moral
worth. Welfare being morally important, then those individuals capable of
experiencing welfare should therefore form part of the moral community. Es-
tablishing a welfare concept will make rulings on which individuals fall within
this group, and our assessment on which they rule in and out will affect our
judgement as to the suitability of the concept.
As occurs sometimes within conceptual engineering, because of the
two vastly different roles or applications for a welfare concept, some have
suggested a use of pluralism, so that the concept used should vary depending
on the different application (Webster 2005, p. 2). For example, something
like a physical concept of welfare might best fit the scientific role, while a
subjective account might better capture our ethical intuitions about the way
their experiences matter to animals. However, while it is clear that there are
these two different roles for, or applications of, the concept of animal welfare,
it does not seem expedient to use two different concepts in each space. We
want our concepts in both areas to refer to the same entity, and thus must
find a single concept to use. Bringing in different concepts would remove
our ability to use our findings from welfare science to inform moral decision-
making; which is currently one of its primary functions. We instead need a
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single concept, and one that both captures the basic state that is of scientific
interest, and is morally relevant.
There have been a number of different concepts of welfare in use, and
many are still in use today. The four most common concepts in use are the
experience of positive and negative mental states by the animal (subjective
welfare); good physical functioning (physical welfare); living naturally (tele-
ological welfare); and meeting animal preferences (preference-based welfare).
Assessing which of these concepts is preferable, requires first identifying what
the requirements are for a concept of welfare, and then assessing how well
these concepts fulfil the requirements. As discussed, for the scientific role,
the requirements are for a concept that is measurable, and fundamental;
while for the moral role, the requirements are for a concept that delineates
something of moral value.
The earlier versions of welfare science used physical concepts, in which
animal welfare consisted in some set of physical functionings - bodily health
and comfort. One of the more prominent of these was the idea of welfare
as coping: an animals welfare consisting in “its state as regards its attempts
to cope with its environment” (Broom 1986, p. 524), trying to meet its
physiological and behavioural needs. These concepts did very well for the
scientific role, but not so well for the moral role. Physical states are easy
to measure - growth rate, reproduction, mortality, prevalence of injury and
disease, cortisol levels and abnormal behaviours. It is more difficult, however,
to make a case as to why they should matter morally. Most of the reasons
we have for thinking that poor physical functioning matters is due to its
negative effects on the subjective experience of animals, which means it is not
fundamental. It also fails to delineate the bearers of moral worth from those
without - if physical functioning is what matters, then animals, plants and
microorganisms may all be said to have a welfare equally worth considering,
and this is not a view many wish to accept.
Natural living, or teleological accounts (Browning 2019) of welfare,
emphasise the overall ’flourishing’ of an animal according to its nature - the
lifestyle for which it has evolved to live; generally focussing on the perfor-
mance of natural behaviours. This concept does poorly on both the scientific
and moral roles. It is not easily measurable, as identifying what count as nat-
ural behaviours and how much of their performance counts as good welfare
is unclear (Veasey et al. 1996). It is also not obviously of moral importance
- although intuitive to some, there is no strong account of how or why nat-
uralness should matter morally (Browning 2019). It also fails to delineate
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our moral circle in line with common intuitions - again, all organisms are
capable of natural functioning, but it is not common to extend equal moral
consideration this distance.
This is also an example of the discrepancy of the use of concepts be-
tween the general public and those within the scientific community, as raised
in Section 2. It is common for those among the general population to take
welfare to consist at least in part in natural living (Lassen et al. 2006; Van-
honacker et al. 2008), though it is not commonly used by the welfare science
community for the reasons discussed above. This gives reason to think that
part of the role of adopting or modifying scientific concepts is to assist in
educating the general public as to the preferred concept and the reasons
underlying its choice. In this case, informing the public as to the defects
within this concept could have wide-reaching effects in the decisions made
by consumers and advocates for animal welfare. Switching out a teleological
concept for an alternative, such as subjective welfare, will alter which condi-
tions might be thought important for welfare. For example zoo visitors often
prefer seeing monkeys in naturalistic island-type enclosures, but in actuality
cage-style exhibits often provide more climbing surfaces and opportunities
for activity, promoting good subjective welfare (Browning and Maple 2019).
Today, the subjective welfare concept is more prominent. While this
account has been used in animal ethics for decades (see e.g. Regan 1983;
Singer 1975, it has only more recently become commonplace within animal
welfare science . Subjective welfare certainly tracks something of moral im-
port - much of the work on the moral importance of animals focuses on
subjective experience, or sentience: “The question is not, Can they reason?
nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham 1879, p. 309). It
is the capacity for pleasure and suffering, as experienced subjectively, that
provides cause for moral concern and delineates the boundaries for moral
consideration. The biggest problem with a subjective welfare concept is that
it may not be considered measurable (Browning 2020). Subjective experi-
ence is inaccessible to direct measurement - we can only gather information
on what animals do, not what they are thinking and feeling (see Veit and
Browning forthcoming). However, it is more common now to accept that
the internal subjective states of animals have measurable effects and “that
some bodily states and behaviour can be used as reasonably reliable guides to
what a human or other animal is experiencing” (Dawkins 1980, p. 11). If we
accept that these sorts of tests are accessing subjective experience, then it is
measurable. Indeed, unless we think subjective experience is epiphenomenal,
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having no causal impact on the world, then there must be behavioural and
physiological effects of mental states, which we can then detect and can form
the basis for measurement.
Another popular welfare concept is a preference-based account of wel-
fare (Dawkins 2003). Under this concept, welfare is good when preferences
are satisfied, and poor when they are frustrated. Preferences do well from a
scientific standpoint. They are easily measurable through preference-based
behavioural tests, in which animals are presented with different options and
observed to see which they choose, and how hard they will work to attain
it. This concept also does well from the moral perspective - preference-based
accounts of wellbeing are common (e.g. Griffin 1986) and most consider the
satisfaction of their desires to be highly valuable. The question in this con-
cept is whether preferences are fundamental. The most common competitor
is the subjective account described above, and it is an open question whether
subjective experiences are valuable because they are desired, or whether de-
sires are valuable because they create positive experiences. Although the
satisfaction of preferences is often closely tied with positive mental states
- and their frustration with negative states - they are separable. Which of
these is taken to be fundamental may push deliberation in the direction of
either of these concepts.
Some modern accounts also include multiple of these components brought
together - the most common being the ’tripartite’ account in which physical,
teleological and subjective components come together, requiring “that ani-
mals should feel well by being free from prolonged or intense fear, pain and
other unpleasant states, and by experiencing normal pleasures; that animals
should function well in the sense of satisfactory health, growth and normal
behavioral and physiological functioning; and that animals should lead nat-
ural lives through the development and use of their natural adaptations”
(Fraser 1999, p. 178). This concept is beneficial as it includes the strengths
of all its component concepts, but the primary problem is in adjudicating
conflicts between the different components. When measures of the different
components give contradictory information, it is not clear what conclusions
should be drawn. If one of the components are given primacy, as is often
the case for subjective experience in these accounts, then it seems that this
is the more fundamental concept that should be used. If possible, a single-
component account will be much more tractable than a multi-component
account.
The example of animal welfare perfectly demonstrates the distinction
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between NCE and MCE. As shown for the different welfare concepts, these
two can be in conflict, and the needs of NCE and MCE may not both
be met within a single concept. However, when we are able to establish a
concept that meets the requirements of both, this gives stronger reasons to
accept that concept. Currently, the subjective or preference concepts appear
to do best under both types of conceptual engineering.
4 Conclusion
To conclude, our distinction between naturalist conceptual engineering (NCE)
and moral conceptual engineering (MCE) refers to the goals of conceptual
engineering, rather than its methods. While Carnapian explication is tradi-
tionally associated with the formal methods and tools of logic and the natu-
ral sciences, amelioration is often understood as the qualitative improvement
of concepts by drawing on the humanities and social sciences (see Novaes
2018). Our pluralist account of conceptual engineering combines these and
other forms of ‘concept improvement’ as mere methodologies for a diverse
set of practices that fall under the umbrella term ‘conceptual engineering’.
Some of these ameliorative methods can be used for both scientific desiderata
and moral/political purposes – something we may very well consider a fea-
ture, rather than a bug. Nevertheless, where philosophers become engaged
in highly divisive debates about concepts with very little consensus, it should
be our task to alleviate and disentangle muddled conceptual confusions. Care
must be taken not to extrapolate from one conceptual debate to all others.
To do so, however, we need to separate the functions, goals, and purposes
for which particular concepts are put to use. After all, concepts, categories,
and classificatory systems play too many roles as to allow for a single sim-
ple monist account of ‘conceptual engineering’. This will require us to move
much closer to examination of scientific practice, history, and sociology – and
hence endorse a pluralist and pragmatic form of conceptual engineering that
is much closer in spirit to Neurath than it is to Carnap.
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